Decentralized currencies and similar blockchain applications require consensus. Bitcoin achieves eventual consensus in a fullydecentralized se ing, but provides very low throughput and high latency with excessive energy consumption. In this paper, we propose identity aging as a novel and more e cient consensus approach. Our main idea is to establish reliable, long-term identities and choose the oldest identity as the miner on each round. Based on this approach, we design two blockchain systems. Our rst system, S , leverages Intel's SGX a estation for identity bootstrapping in a partially-decentralized se ing, where blockchain is permissionless, but we trust Intel for a estation. Our second system, D , creates new identities through a novel mining mechanism and provides consensus in a fully-decentralized se ing, similar to Bitcoin. One of the main bene ts of identity aging is that it does not require constant computation. Our analysis and experiments show that identity aging provides signi cant performance improvements over Bitcoin with strong security guarantees.
INTRODUCTION
Since the popularity of Bitcoin [39] , there has been signi cant interest in development of decentralized digital currencies. Any decentralized currency requires a consensus mechanism to prevent double spending. e Nakamoto consensus used in Bitcoin leverages Proof-of-Work (PoW) puzzles [19] and economic incentives: all transactions are recorded to a public ledger organized as a chain of blocks, participants are incentivized to mine (solve puzzles) on the longest branch using rewards, and consensus is eventually reached on one branch, assuming that the adversary does not control majority of the computing power and messages are delivered su ciently reliably [21] . Experience from the last ten years has shown that Bitcoin works in practice and it is indeed possible to realize a digital currency without a trusted authority.
However, Bitcoin has also serious limitations. When run on a global peer-to-peer network, it's consensus mechanism requires infrequent and small blocks. As a result, Bitcoin can process only 7 transactions per second. Because consensus is eventual, transaction con rmation takes up to 60 minutes. Such performance limitations make Bitcoin impractical for many payments. e combined Proof-of-Work computation of all miners consumes huge amount of energy -at the time of writing, comparable to a mid-size developed country [17] . Bitcoin has also other problems, such as limited privacy [8, 36] , reward centralization [22] and node eclipsing [23] .
Blockchain e ciency. Consequently, researchers and practitioners have examined numerous alternative blockchain schemes. We focus on consensus e ciency, and consider other improvements, like increased privacy [35, 45] , complementary to our work.
Blockchain performance can be improved in multiple ways. One common approach is sharding [5, 15, 30, 31, 34, 43] , where system participants are divided into commi ees that process distinct sets of transaction and a nal commi ee combines the results. e main drawback of PoW-based sharding is that such schemes still require constant computation to establish identities for commi ee selection. Another common approach is Proof of Stake (PoS) [27, 37] , where a consensus leader (or miner) is chosen randomly with a probability that is proportional to owned coins. PoS schemes do not require constant computation, but have their own shortcomings.
e leader selection is typically based on an expensive multi-party computation protocol and many PoS systems are vulnerable to new adversarial strategies, such as nothing-at-stake a ack, where the adversary leverages the fact that extending multiple branches is inexpensive, or grinding a ack, where the adversary creates blocks or identities in a way that gives him an advantage in leader selection [7] . Many schemes also assume (weakly) synchronous communication -an assumption that does not always hold in global peer-to-peer networks.
Researchers have also explored if trusted computing environments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX [3] , can enable more e cient blockchains in a partially-decentralized se ing. Intel SGX enables protected applications, called enclaves, that are isolated from malicious privileged so ware. In Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET) [1] participants are enclaves that wait a randomly chosen time and the enclave that nishes rst becomes the miner. PoET requires no constant computation, but is vulnerable to compromise of one or few SGX processors. In Resource E cient Mining (REM) [49] each enclave performs some useful processing and produces a matching evidence. REM is more tolerant to CPU compromise, as the reported processing can be capped, but it does not save any energy.
Our solution. In this paper, we propose a novel blockchain consensus approach that we call identity aging. Our solution is designed to improve blockchain e ciency, fairness and a ack-resilience under realistic communication model. Our main idea is simple but powerful: we establish reliable (i.e., Sybil-a ack resistant) identities that are recorded to a public ledger, the age of each identity corresponds to the number of rounds passed since the last successful mining, and on each round one of the oldest identities is chosen to mine the next block. e miner selection is an interactive protocol between a set of eligible miner candidates and a randomly chosen validator commi ee. e created blocks record active commi ee participation and thus allow exclusion of inactive identities from miner and validator selection.
On a high level, our idea can be seen as a variation of Proof of Stake, where the mining power of each participant is proportional to the number of controlled identities (instead of coins). In contrast to previous proposals that leverage the notion of aging (e.g., Peercoin [28] ), we decouple age from coins to ensure that all coins have the same market value (a necessary property for any currency).
Based on this idea, we design two systems. Our rst system, S (Semi-Centralized Incentivized Fair E cient Resilient Consensus), is designed for a partially-decentralized se ing, where the blockchain is permissionless, but we trust Intel to run the SGX a estation service correctly (similar to [1, 49] ). We bootstrap reliable identities from the existing infrastructure of SGX processors.
e number of controlled identities corresponds to the number of owned SGX processors by each participant, but importantly the processors do not have to perform constant computation. In contrast to previous SGX-based consensus mechanisms [1, 49] , our system saves energy and tolerates compromised CPUs. Even platform vulnerabilities like Spectre [12, 29] or Meltdown [33] do not break our system, because the system participants gain no advantage by a acking their own platforms. Later in the paper, we discuss how identities could be bootstrapped also from other infrastructures, like credit cards or mobile subscriptions.
Our second system, D (Decentralized Incentivized Fair E cient Resilient Consensus), is designed for a fully-decentralized se ing, similar to Bitcoin and many other recent blockchains. Here, we leverage another simple but e ective idea: each successful mining event creates an identity reward and such rewards enable enrollment of new identities. is approach allows controlled creation of new identities starting from an initial fair distribution that can be established using an initial PoW phase, for example.
Our analysis shows that identity aging provides similar or be er security guarantees than Bitcoin. Short-lived forks may exist, but a er a small number of rounds (two or three) the system reaches consensus on one branch with very high probability. We also show that identity aging is resilient against common a acks, such as block withholding, nothing-at-stake, grinding, long-range a ack. Such security properties are provided under an realistic communication model, where delivery of all messages cannot be guaranteed. Moreover, identity-aging removes incentives for pooled mining which improves decentralization. e performance of our consensus mechanism depends primarily on the underlying network and the size of the system. We measured message delivery using a globally-distributed peer-to-peer that we built and estimated throughput and latency in identity aging. For deployments of 10,000 active participants (the approximate size of the current Bitcoin network), transaction con rmation takes 10-15 seconds and our system can process roughly 1500 transactions per second. In comparison to Bitcoin, both latency and throughput are improved two orders of magnitude.
Our approach has also minor drawbacks like small privacy loss due to correlation of mining events (but not transaction events), increased susceptibility to DoS a acks due to more predictable miner selection, and reduced performance due to the required tracking of active identities for the largest deployments.
Contributions. To summarize, our paper makes the following main contributions:
• New consensus approach. We propose identity aging as a novel blockchain consensus mechanism.
• Partially-decentralized blockchain. We design a new blockchain system, called S , by bootstrapping identities from the Intel SGX a estation infrastructure.
• Fully-decentralized blockchain. We design another new blockchain system, called D , by leveraging an initial fair distribution of identities and identity mining for fully-decentralized deployments.
• Analysis and evaluation. We show that identity aging provides signi cant performance improvements and strong security guarantees assuming a realistic communication model. e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of identity aging. Sections 3 and 4 describe our two systems. Section 5 provides security analysis and Section 6 performance evaluation. Section 7 includes discussion, Section 8 reviews related work, and Section 9 concludes the paper.
IDENTITY AGING
is section provides an overview of our approach. We explain our goals, the adversary and communication models, and the main idea of consensus using identity aging.
Goals
Our goal is to design a consensus mechanism for a decentralized blockchain. e blockchain can be used for a digital currency or any other application that enables signi cant rewards that incentivize behavior similar to monetary rewards. We assume that the blockchain is used to record transactions, but our consensus mechanism is agnostic to their type that can be pseudonymous as in Bitcoin or anonymous as in recent proposals like [26, 35] .
We consider two separate trust models. e rst is a partiallydecentralized se ing, where the blockchain consensus is maintained by a permissionless set of system participants in a decentralized manner, but we rely on Intel to manufacture processors and run the SGX a estation service correctly. In this se ing, our main goal is to improve the e ciency and security of previous SGX consensus mechanisms [1, 49] . In particular, we want to design a solution that tolerates compromised CPUs and requires no constant computation.
Our second trust model is a fully-decentralized blockchain, similar to Bitcoin and many other recent blockchain proposals. In this se ing, we have three main goal. e rst goal is to eliminate the need for constant computation that is a major problems in all PoW systems, such as Bitcoin [39] , Bitcoin NG [20] and various sharding schemes [5, 15, 30, 31, 34, 43] . e second goal is to provide a scheme that is robust to known a ack strategies, such as nothing-at-stake, grinding, and long-range a ack, that especially a ect many of Proof-of-Stake systems [7] . e third goal is to design a system that works in global peer-to-peer networks where reliable communication cannot be always guaranteed.
Adversary and Communication Model
We consider economically-driven users, who seek to maximize their own gain and whose investment in breaking the system is proportional to the gained value -or the potentially the lost value in case of being caught from cheating. We model system participants as processors and consider an adversary that controls a signi cant fraction α of all n processors (e.g., α = 0.33). We denote the number of adversary-controller processors m = α · n. A single malicious user may have purchased m processors or a number of users may collude and use their combined m processors together. In the la er case, we consider the set of colluding users as the adversary.
We assume an adversary that can add new processors that he controls to the system, as long as his fraction of all processors stays within α. e adversary cannot choose for every time window t 2 which m processors he controls (e.g., t = 5 seconds). We note that this is in contrast to some of the recent schemes that consider a fully-adaptive adversary [27, 37] that can freely choose controlled participants for each time window. Our take is that a such fullyadaptive adversary is interesting, and worth studying, but o en not realistic. In practice platform compromise is hard to detect and repair. Furthermore, a compromise of one computing platform does not mean that another is no longer in control of the adversary.
In contrast to the previous SGX consensus schemes [1, 49] , we assume that the adversary can break SGX protections on all m processors that are under his physical possession. For example, through hardware a acks or discovered platform vulnerabilities [12, 29, 33 ] the adversary can extract secret keys from CPUs and modify enclave control ow. We consider such a acks time consuming and expensive, but realistic in applications like digital currencies, where the economic payo can outweigh the cost of the a ack. We stress that SGX was designed to protect enclaves from malicious privileged so ware, but not from physical tampering [13] .
We assume that the participants communicate over a global peerto-peer network, similar to Bitcoin. Within each time window t each processors is able to communication with all other processors except a small fraction β (e.g., β = 0.05). For example, in the (arguably slow) Bitcoin network broadcasted blocks are received by 95% of the nodes a er 40 seconds [16] . Finally, we assume that participants have loosely synchronized clocks.
Main Idea
Our consensus mechanism is based on long-term, reliable identities. By the term "reliable" we mean identities that the adversary cannot create without restrictions (Sybil a ack [18] ) and at the same time the system should be permissionless, allowing any user to participate in blockchain consensus. More precisely, identity establishment should be such that an adversary that controls fraction α of all processors should be able to control at most α of all identities.
We describe two ways to establish such reliable identities. e rst is bootstrapping from an existing infrastructure of Intel SGX a estation (Section 3) and the second is mining the identities starting from an initial fair distribution of identities (Section 4). We represent identities as public keys and every identity creation event is recorded, in a veri able manner, to the public ledger (blockchain). For each identity an age can be determined by counting the number of blocks since its creation or the last successful block mining. Figure 1 illustrates the high-level operation in identity aging. A er the initialization phase (that guarantees an initial fair distribution of identities), the system proceeds in rounds of xed duration t r (e.g., t r = 5 seconds). In the beginning of each round, every identity checks if it is a miner candidate. As candidates we select a set of oldest identities with recent recorded activity in the ledger. On the beginning of each round, we also select a random sampling of validators.
Each miner candidate broadcasts an Intent message that is bound to one chain branch and set of proposed transactions. Based on the received intent messages, the validators pick the oldest candidate and send back to it a Confirm message. If a miner candidate receives the required quorum q of con rmation messages, it is allowed to create and broadcast a new Block.
e miner includes to the block new transactions and the received con rmation messages. By parsing the chain, every participant can verify which identities have recently recorded activity in the form of con rmations. To ensure liveness, we exclude inactive participants from miner candidate and validator selection. New participants can join the system at any time by sending an Enroll message that contains a publicly veri able proof of a new identity (SGX a estation or mined token). Miners include such new identities to created blocks (eventually).
SCIFER SYSTEM
In this section we describe our rst system, called S , that is designed for a partially-decentralized se ing. For bootstrapping reliable identities we leverage Intel's SGX a estation infrastructure. Later in the paper (see Section 7) we discuss how similar identities could be bootstrapped also from other infrastructures, such as credit cards or mobile subscriptions.
Bootstrapping from SGX
Intel's So ware Guard Extensions (SGX) [3, 13] enables execution of protected applications, called enclaves, in isolation from any untrusted system so ware such as a malicious OS. SGX protects integrity of enclave execution and con dentiality of enclave data. Protections in the processor prevent a malicious OS from directly reading or modifying enclave memory at runtime. Processors have also keys that allow encryption for persistent storage (sealing).
For our solution, the most relevant part of SGX is its remote attestation mechanism. During manufacturing, each SGX processors is equipped with a key that is certi ed by Intel. A estation is a protocol where a remote entity can verify that speci c enclave code runs on a genuine SGX processor. In a estation, the processors signs a statement over the enclave's so ware con guration, which was recorded during its initialization, using the certi ed processorspeci c key.
e veri er forwards the signed statement to Intel A estation Service (IAS), an online service run by Intel, that sends back signed a estation evidence, assuming the remote a estation was successful.
SGX a estation uses group signatures and it is anonymous, in the sense that it does not identify the a ested hardware platform (e.g., the processor serial number or similar identi er) [25] . Importantly for our solution, SGX a estation supports also a linkable mode of a estation that allows the remote veri er to test if the currently a ested processor has been previously a ested without identifying it. We provide further SGX details in Appendix B.
In S , we leverage the linkable mode of SGX a estation for bootstrapping identities. As identities we use public keys of key pairs that are generated inside enclaves. We bind these keys to the a estation protocol and save the a estation evidence (signed by IAS) to the blockchain. Given such evidence, anyone can verify that the same processor is enrolled at most once.
Interestingly, our solution does not require enclave data condentiality or execution integrity. We use sealing to protect the IAS access credential, but its secrecy is not relevant for blockchain consensus. us, our system tolerates adversaries that can compromise their own processors. Next, we describe the S system in detail. 3 e initialization phase guarantees an initial and fair distribution of identities that are recorded to the ledger. A er that, the system proceeds in rounds of xed duration. During each round, one of the oldest identities is selected as the miner that creates and broadcast a new block. New participants can join the system on any round.
Initialization
A new blockchain instance can be initialized by any (potentially untrusted) entity that we call chain creator. e creator registers with Intel and obtains an access credential c a for the Intel A estation Service (IAS). At registration, the creator speci es that linkable mode of a estation is used.
e creator chooses n 0 platforms as the initial system members. ese platforms install enclave code that creates an asymmetric key pair, seals the private key sk i , and exports the public key pk i .
e creator performs a remote a estation on each of the selected platforms. During a estation, each platform supplies a hash of pk i as the USERDATA to be included as part of the QUOTE structure Q i (see Appendix B). If the a estation is successful, IAS signs Q i that includes a pseudonym p i for the a ested platform. e a ested enclaves send their public keys pk i to the creator. e creator checks if the public keys match the respective hashes reported in each QUOTE structure Q i and if all a ested platforms are separate, i.e., each Q i has a di erent pseudonym p i . If this holds, it constructs a genesis block Block 0 = (pk 1 , Q 1 , pk 2 , Q 2 , ..., h e , id) that includes public keys pk i and the signed quote structures Q i for each initial member, a hash of the enclave code h e , and a hash id over all elements that serves as the chain identi er. e creator publishes the genesis block and sends the IAS access credential c a to the a ested enclaves that seal it.
Enrollment
New participants can join the system on any round. e joining platform installs the enclave code de ned by h e , creates a key pair, seals the private part sk n , exports the public part pk n and contacts one of the current members (e.g., by broadcasting to the peer-topeer network). e current member performs remote a estation on the new platform using h e as the reference. During a estation, the enclave of the new platform supplies a hash h(pk n ||r ||h b ) as its USERDATA, where r and h b are the round number and hash of the latest block (to bind the enrollment to a speci c branch). If the a estation is successful, the existing member obtains a signed QUOTE structure Q n from IAS, including an a estation pseudonym p n . It veri es that the pseudonym p n does not appear in any of the previously enrolled platforms in the chain (recall that each Q i is saved to the ledger). e veri er sends c a to the a ested enclave and constructs an enrollment message Enroll n = (Q n , pk n , r, h b ) that serves as a membership proof and broadcasts this to the network.
Once the membership proof is included to a new mined block, a new identity is established.
Mining Protocol
A er initialization, the system proceeds in rounds of xed length t r . Figure 2 illustrates the mining protocol that consists of three phases. In the beginning of the round, every identity tests if it is a miner candidate or validator for that round using SelectCandidates and SelectValidators algorithms that are described below. e number of miner candidates C can be a small xed value (e.g., C = 10), while the size of the validator commi ee V depends on the number of currently active identities n a (e.g., V = 0.01 × n a ). We explain the details of the miner candidate and validator selection below.
As in most permissionless blockchains, every successfully mined block (that will become part of the longest branch) will be rewarded.
e type and amount of the reward depends on the blockchain application. For example, in a digital currency the reward could be a signi cant amount of new coins.
Intent phase. e rst phase of each round is an intent phase, where each miner candidate c broadcasts an intent message Intent = (id, pk c , r , h p , h t x , si c ) that contains the chain identi er id, the candidate's identity pk c , the current round number r , the branch of the chain that the candidate proposes to extend indicated by the hash of the previous block h p , hash of the transactions h t x the miner proposes to include to the mined block, and the candidate's signature si c over these elements. In case multiple chain branches exist, the candidate uses the SelectBranch algorithm, described below, to choose which branch to extend.
Con rmation phase. Each validator veri es all
Intent messages received during the intent phase by checking that the sender is a valid miner candidate for this round. Among the received intent messages, the validator selects the candidate with the highest age (i.e., the identity with most rounds from previous mining or enrollment), and sends to it a con rmation message Confirm →c = (id, h i , h(pk ), si ) that indicates that validator has con rmed candidate c. e message contains the chain identi er id, hash of the intent message h i , the validator identity h(pk ), and a signature si over the previous elements.
In case multiple candidates have the same age, the validator picks a pseudorandom number using the stable part of the chain as a seed, sorts the candidates of same age based on the binaries of their (public key) identities, and selects one of them based on the 4 pseudorandom number. e purpose of this process is to ensure that all (non-malicious) validators choose the same candidate. e seed for pseudo-randomness can be computed as h(Block r −d ) where r is the current round number and d denotes the maximum depth of forks (see Section 5 for analysis). If one validator received intent messages that refer to more than one chain branches, the validator picks the branch (and the intent) to con rm using the SelectBranch algorithm.
Block dissemination phase. e nal phase of the round is block creation and dissemination. If a candidate c received the required quorum of q con rmations, it becomes an eligible miner for the current round.
e miner creates a new block Block r = (Intent, {Confirm}, {tx }, {Enroll}, si c ) that contains the intent message, received con rmation messages, new transactions tx, membership proofs of new enrolled platforms, and a signature si c over the previous elements by the miner. e miner broadcasts the created block.
Mining Algorithms
Candidate selection. e SelectCandidates algorithm parses the blockchain based on two adjustable parameters: activity threshold T a and the number of candidates C. e activity threshold can be, e.g., T a = 3000 rounds that would match a few hours of system operation.
First, SelectCandidates selects the chain branch to use based on SelectBranch (described below).
en, it parses the selected branch starting from the newest block. For the T a latest blocks, the algorithm adds senders of con rmation messages to a list that represents members with recorded activity. Next, the algorithm parses the chain starting from the oldest block. When block mining or enrollment by any of the identities in the list is encountered, the identity's age (i.e., the number of blocks from the latest block) is saved to the list. is process is continued until every identity in the list is assigned an age. Finally, the list is sorted by age and C oldest identities, and their ages, are returned.
Validator selection. e SelectValidators algorithm selects a commi ee of V validators (e.g., V = 100 for a system of 10,000 active identities). SelectValidators computes a list of recently active identities as explained above. A er that, it selects V identities using standard simple random sampling (with replacement), where all listed members are sorted based on their public key binary and the required random number is generated using the stable part of the blockchain as the seed. e seed for pseudorandomness is computed as h(Block r −d ).
Branch selection. e SelectBranch algorithm rst veri es the correctness of each branch using VerifyBranch algorithm described below. en, it computes a length for each of the branches which is de ned by the number of rounds with missing blocks. e longest branch is always selected. If more than one branch has the same length (i.e., an equal number of missing blocks), the algorithm chooses the branch using a pseudorandom number whose seed is derived from the stable part of the chain.
Branch veri cation. e VerifyBranch algorithm checks that a given chain branch is correctly constructed. As the rst step it traverses the chain and checks that each block contains a correct hash of the previous block. e next step is to verify that all enrolled platforms have valid membership proofs (correct a estation evidence and unique a estation pseudonym in the case of SGX identities). A er that, the algorithm veri es that the miner of each block was an eligible candidate on that round (SelectCandidates), the block contains the required q con rmation tokens, the con rmation token contain the hash of the intent message included to the block, and the validators that were eligible con rmers on that round (SelectValidators).
Re-enrollment
If an enrolled identity does not participate in the system by sending con rmation messages during T a rounds (e.g., few hours), it will be excluded from miner and validator selection. In such cases, the platform can perform the enrollment protocol again. In reenrollment, a chosen veri er checks that the IAS service returns 5 the same pseudonym p i that was used for this identity (public key pk i ) during enrollment. If this is the case, the veri er can create and broadcast a new membership proof with a ag that indicates re-enrollment. Once such re-enrollment is recorded to a block, the platform is included to miner candidate and validator selection again.
DIFER SYSTEM
In this section, we design a second system, called D , that is based on the same idea of identity aging but tailored for the fullydecentralized se ing. e key problem that we need to solve is how to establish the needed reliable identities without bootstrapping from an existing infrastructure such as SGX a estation. Identity creation should be permissionless in the sense that any user can enroll, but controlled in the sense that the adversary that controls a fraction α of processors can create at most α of the new identities.
Mining Identities
Our approach is to mine identities, that is, reward successful block creation events with new identities, assuming an initial fair distribution of identities, where the adversary controls at most α of the initial identities. Such initial distribution can be established using a Proof-of-Work phase.
A straw-man solution is to apply the idea of Proof of Stake such that successful mining is rewarded with new coins and each owned coin directly corresponds to one identity in the system. As creation of new coins is recorded to the ledger, on each round the owner of the oldest coin can be chosen as the miner, following the principle of identity aging. Such approach would be resilient against Sybil a acks, as mined new coins and identities are proportional to the initial and fair distribution of identities.
However, this straw-man solution has two major limitations. e rst is that, to support identity-aging miner selection, the coins must be made indivisible units. Indivisible coins increase transaction size and the ledger processing overhead and reduce system performance. In a system with total value, say, one billion US dollars, and the smallest currency unit matching to one US cent, a hundred billion coins and identities would be needed. e second drawback is that di erent coins of same denomination would have di erent market values. For example, if a coin is old and soon eligible for mining, its market value is arguably higher than that of a new coin. Fungibility (i.e., that the units of the same denomination all have the same value and are interchangeable) is an important property of any monetary system. To avoid the above problems, we adopt an approach, where the creation of new identities is proportional to the currently controlled identities, but we decouple the direct linkage between the mined coins and the identities, to enable coin divisibility and fungibility. Every mining operation creates new coins (or similar rewards depending on the blockchain application), and additionally an identity reward. Su ciently many identity rewards (≥ 1), in turn, can be used to enroll a new identity to the system. e tokens can be used in two ways. First, the miner (the owner of tokens) can enroll a new identity for himself. Second, owner of the tokens can sell them to a new user that wants to participate in the system, and the new user can then enroll a new identity into the system. As the tokens that create new identities are decoupled from coins, coins can be divided for transaction e ciency and coins are also interchangeable.
Next, we explain our D system in more detail. e mining protocol and algorithms are the same as before (Section 3) with only minor modi cations. Initialization and enrollment are speci c to the D system.
Initialization
e initial distribution of identities can be established using a preliminary Proof-of-Work (PoW) mining phase. Every successful PoW mining creates a block InitBlock i = (h i−1 , pk i , pow) that contains a hash h of the previous block, public key pk i of the miner that de nes a new identity in the system, and a Proof-of-Work solution pow. Initial blocks do not contain transactions, they are broadcasted to the peer-to-peer network, and their recipients continue mining based on them. Such blocks have an order in the chain and thus every initially mined identity has an associated age. e initial distribution of identities is the series of public keys pk 0 , pk 1 , ..., pk n 0 from the sequence of blocks InitBlock 0 = (pk 0 , pow 0 ),
e initialization phase can last as long as su ciently many (n 0 ) identities have been created. e di culty of the computational puzzle can be set such that frequency of mining events is low to make forks during initialization rare. Potential forks can be solved as in Bitcoin. If further incentives, besides the initial identities, for the initial mining work are required, every successful mining operation can be additionally rewarded with coins or similar application-speci c rewards.
Mining and Enrollment
A er the initialization phase, the system proceeds in mining rounds as detailed in Section 4.3. e only di erence is that each block creation is rewarded with the normal mining rewards (such as new coins), but also with a new identity token. By adjusting the number of required tokens it is possible to control the rate of new identities entering the system.
We design the identity rewards and enrollment as follows. Once a participant pk m has mined the required number of blocks with the same identity, it creates a new key pair pk n , sk n that it uses for the enrollment. e enrollment message Enroll = (h 1 , h 2 , ..., h p , pk n , si m ) contains a set of hashes {h i } that refer to the previously mined blocks by identity pk m (i.e., blocks with unused identity rewards), the public key of the new identity pk n , and a signature si m over these elements using the private key of the identity pk m that mined the previous blocks.
e participant broadcasts the enrollment. message, and once it is included to a new block, a new entity exists in the system. e same mechanism can also be used to allow new participants to join the system. e owner of the identity tokens can sell them to another participant by including a public key received from the buyer to the enrollment message. e payment from the buyer to the seller can be realized, e.g., using at money. e buyer of the tokens should give the money to the seller only once he sees the correct enrollment message in the chain in a block that has been extended with d valid blocks to prevent double selling of tokens. 6
Chain veri cation works as already explained in Section 3 with the following additional checks for the correctness of enrollment. Validity of the enrollment message requires that (i) the set of hashes h i refer to previous valid blocks, (ii) the previous valid blocks have not been used to create a new identity already, (iii) all the referred previous blocks have been created by the same identity pk m , and (iv) the signature of the enrollment message is correct.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section analyze the security of identity aging based mining. First, we show that identity aging provides consensus assuming a fair distribution of identities.
en, we discuss known a ack strategies. And nally, we show that identity creation in S and D provide reliable identities.
Stability
For the analysis of identity aging we use the de nition of stability from Bonneau et al. [10] with minor adaptation. A consensus mechanism is called stable, if it provides:
• Eventual consensus. At any time, all honest nodes agree upon a pre x of what will eventually become the valid blockchain. Due to the possibility of temporary forks, at any given moment we do not require that the entire current chain is the pre x.
• Exponential convergence. e probability of a fork at depth d in the chain is O(2 −d ). is gives participants high con dence that a er a transaction is added to a block and the block is extended with a small number of valid blocks, the transaction is permanently part of the chain.
• Correctness. All the blocks in the pre x of the eventually valid chain will only include valid transactions.
• Liveness. New blocks continue to be added and valid transactions will be included in the blockchain within a reasonable amount of time.
• Fairness. On expectation, a miner with fraction α of all processors will mine fraction α of all blocks, and collect a similar fraction of mining rewards.
Consensus and convergence. To explain the possible scenarios in miner con rmation, Figure 3 shows an example where the three oldest miner candidates are A, B and C. e validator committee is sampled based on a pseudorandom value on each round. On the average, α of the sampled validators are adversary-controlled and β of the validators may not receive Intent sent by the oldest candidate A. e non-colluding validators who received all messages (fraction 1 − α − β), always con rm A as the miner.
ose noncolluding validators that did not receive all messages may con rm one another candidate (B or C). e adversary-controlled validators may con rm more than one candidate (A and B), although such equivocation leaves evidence that can be easily used to penalize malicious identities (see Section 7) . e exact number of validators on each of the above discussed groups varies on each round. In a rare case, that we call adversarial sampling, enough adversary-controlled identities may be chosen to the validator commi ee, and thus also the second-oldest candidate B may received the required quorum of con rmations, causing two eligible miners (A and B) on the same round and a fork in the chain. We denote the probability of adversarial sampling as Pr(AS). Assuming an unbiased pseudorandomness seed and su ciently large n, this probability can be computed as:
where V is the number of validators, q is the quorum size, α is the fraction of colluding identities, and β is the fraction that cannot communicate with the oldest candidate. For example, when α = 0.33, β = 0.05, V = 100 and q = 54, then Pr(AS) = 0.0008. Such sampling would take place, on the average, every 1200 rounds.
Extending both forked branches requires another similar sampling. e probability of consecutive sampling decreases exponentially and the probability of three consecutive samplings is very low (5.78×10 −10 ). For such parameter values we consider the maximum depth of forks d = 3.
Once the adversary can no longer create a new block within the forked branch, two options exist. First, it may publish his branch. e next miner chooses randomly between two branches of equal length and extends the selected branch (recall SelectBranch from Section 3.5). On the following rounds, all honest members extend this longest branch. Second, the adversary may choose to release it later (block withholding). However, as the honest nodes will always extend the longest branch and the adversary can only extend his branch with few blocks, withholding strategy cannot create deeper forks.
Increasing the quorum size q reduces the possibility of forks further, but weakens liveness as discussed below. Also a larger validator commi ee size V reduces the possibility of forks, but causes an increased performance overhead due to more included con rmation messages (see Section 6) .
e adversary can enroll multiple new identities to the system within a short period of time and consequently an identity controlled by the adversary can be selected as the miner on several consecutive rounds. In such cases, the probability that the adversary can mine more than one block on each of these rounds is also low (Pr(AS)), because the non-colluding validators con rm only one Intent per round.
Correctness. If a miner publishes a block containing invalid transaction, none of the non-colluding nodes will accept this block.
As explained above, the probability that the adversary-controlled nodes can con rm multiple successive invalid blocks decreases exponentially, and thus the stable part of the chain (i.e., the pre x up to Block r −d ) contains only valid transactions.
Liveness. Successful block generation on each round requires that the oldest miner candidates receives the required quorum of con rmations from the validators. To analyze the probability for this, we rst consider the benign case where all validators (also the adversary-controlled identities) con rm the oldest Intent message they receive. We denote the probability that more than V − q validators will be sampled from those identities that did not receive the intent message as benign liveness violation Pr(BL) and compute it as:
Given the previous example parameters, this probability is negligible (6.96 × 10 −33 ).
Next, we consider the case where the adversary reduces the probability of successful mining by not sending con rmation messages. Such adversarial liveness violation probability Pr(AL) can be computed as:
Given the previous example parameters, the adversary can prevent mining with probability 0.062, that is, on the average every 16th round. e probability of successive samplings that allow the adversary to prevent mining reduces exponentially. e probability to prevent mining on ve successive rounds, for example, is 9.37 × 10 −7 . If the adversary continues this strategy longer than the activity period T a , his identities will be considered inactive and they can no longer reduce the mining probability for other participants. Additionally, participants have an incentive to provide con rmations that ensure eligibility for mining. e quorum size q presents a trade-o between fork depths that determine transaction con rmation latency and liveness that describes how e ectively the adversary can prevent mining and thus temporarily reduce system throughput, as illustrated in Figure 4 . Smaller q causes higher probability for forks, while larger q allows the adversary to prevent mining with higher probability. Figure 4a shows an example case with V = 100 validators and α = 0.33. A quorum size q ≈ 50 provides both low probability for forks and low probability that the adversary can prevent mining several rounds. Figure 4b shows that increasing the validator commi ee size to V = 200 reduces these probabilities further. Figure 4c shows that if the adversary controls a larger fraction of the active identities (α = 0.4) these probabilities increase signi cantly. In each of the gures, the black do ed line highlights a threshold of 10 −8 that we consider an acceptable probability for forks in many scenarios.
In a rare case, where a signi cant portion of the network simultaneously goes o ine (e.g., a problem with a major ISP), our system will experience a temporary drop in throughput, as the candidate nodes have low probability of receiving the required con rmations and thus on many rounds no miner will be chosen. Once the nodes are back online, the system will regain its normal throughput.
Fairness. Identity aging essentially performs a round-robin miner selection, and therefore each participant with a fraction α of enrolled processors will mine, on expectation, a fraction α of blocks.
e adversary can a empt to violate system fairness in two ways. e rst approach is that the adversary does not include Enroll messages from the targeted victim participant to his blocks. is approach can delay enrollment of a new identity by a few rounds, but not prevent it, and thus such approach does not violate fairness in long term.
e second approach is that the adversary does not include con rmation messages from the victim to his blocks and a er T a rounds the victim is excluded from miner candidate selection and has to re-enroll. Such adversarial exclusion probability Pr(AE) can be computed as:
.
Assuming n = 10, 000 active participants (similar to Bitcoin) and our example parameters (V = 100 and T a = 2000), the adversarial exclusion probability Pr(AE) = 1.41 × 10 −6 . Active participants will be excluded from mining very rarely.
If the system grows signi cantly larger than that (e.g., n = 100, 000) we either need to increase the activity period or the validator commi ee size to keep Pr(AE) low. e rst approach increases blockchain processing time, while the second implies reduced throughput, as more con rmation messages are included to blocks. We analyze these two trade-o s in Section 6.
Attack Discussion
Nothing-at-stake attack. In many PoS systems, once a speci c participant is chosen as the miner, block creation does not consume signi cant resources. Consequently, the chosen miner has an incentive to create multiple blocks and extend several branches to maximize his chances of extending the eventually winning branch and collecting the mining reward. Such adversarial behavior is called nothing-at-stake a ack.
In identity aging, the miner indicates the extended chain branch h p in the broadcasted Intent. Non-colluding validators con rm only one Intent per round and our analysis above shows that the probability that the adversary-controlled validators con rm multiple intents is small and due to long-term identities such behavior can be easily penalized (see Section 7). erefore, the chosen miner can, with high probability, only extend one branch.
Grinding attack. A common approach in commi ee-based consensus systems is to derive the required randomness for commi ee selection from the stable part of the chain. Some such systems can be vulnerable to a grinding a ack, where the current miner tries out many di erent block values and publishes the one that improves his chances of being selected as the miner soon again. Alternative, the participants could try to choose their identities (e.g., public keys) such that they gain an advantage in miner selection.
In identity aging, the candidate indicates the set of transactions h t x that he proposes to include to the mined block.
is serves as a commitment, that the miner candidate cannot change a er Intent broadcast. e validators include a random value to their con rmation tokens that must be included to the created block.
us, the nal block value cannot be chosen by the miner candidate 8 e quorum size q provides a trade-o between the probability of forks and liveness. Increased V enables both shallow forks and good liveness. Larger α means that only one of the above is possible.
alone and similar grinding is not possible. Also identities must be chosen at the time of enrollment which is prior to commi ee selection.
Long-range attack. In some schemes identities may become practically worthless to their owners over time. For example, if an identity is used for mining, it has collected reward and exchanged it to goods, the identity has no longer value for it owner. An adversary might be able to purchase a large fraction (more than α) of such identities and use them to re-write mining events from the past. In identity aging, identities continue to have value and thus similar long-range a acks are unlikely.
Identity Creation

S
. e adversary may a empt to enroll non-SGX platforms to a chain. Such false enrollment would fail, as the IAS service will not return a signed QUOTE needed for enrollment. Enrolling the same SGX platform multiples times would fail as well, because the IAS service would return the same pseudonym p n that is already recorded for another identity in the chain. e third alternative is to enroll the same SGX platform to multiple chains and try to reuse enrollment from one chain to another. Because the QUOTE contains the chain identi er id, this approach would also fail. We conclude that the adversary cannot enroll more identities than the number of SGX platforms he controls.
Perhaps a surprising property of our system is that the adversary does not gain advantage by breaking into his own SGX processors. Besides a estation, we only use enclaves for the protection of the IAS credential. Leakage of this credential does not allow the adversary to create additional identities. A malicious chain creator could initialize an invalid chain, where all members are not SGX processors. However, any legitimate participant can detect this due to missing QUOTEs in the genesis block and neglect the chain. e partially-decentralized S system has one centralized component: Intel's a estation service (IAS). If this service is unavailable temporarily, new nodes cannot be enrolled during its downtime, but the system can mine new blocks and thus process incoming transactions.
D
. Identity mining in D requires an initial fair distribution of identities.
is can be achieved using standard Proofor-Work phase. For example, with a computational puzzle that takes on the average 30 minutes, an initialization phase that creates n 0 = 1000 identities would last approximately 21 days. Our above analysis shows that identity aging provides fairness, and thus the distribution of identity tokens and new enrolled identities is also fair.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the performance of identity aging. First, we measure message delivery times using a globally-distributed peer-to-peer. A er that, we estimate the latency and throughput in identity aging using the message delivery times.
Experimental Setup
To measure message delivery, we built a globally distributed peerto-peer network using Amazon's AWS infrastructure. We instantiated nodes in Frankfurt, London, Singapore, Mumbai and Oregon. We used the EC2 compute services with nodes ranging from t2.micro (single vCPU with 1 GB RAM) to m4.2xlarge (8 vCPUs and 16 GB RAM). e node so ware was wri en in Java and run on Ubuntu/Linux OS.
To simulate the worst case scenario in commi ee selection, we ensured that the miner was never located in the same data center as any of the validators. To simulate global distribution of participants in the peer-to-peer network, we enforced that messages have to travel through at least x di erent nodes (x being 0, 2 and 6) before reaching their destination. We set the intent and con rmation message sizes to 1 KB (although actual messages are smaller). For blocks we tested for three sizes: 500KB, 1MB and 2MB.
We used Dandelion-style message passing [48] that reduces the number of long-distance hops in a global P2P network. In particular, we kept the out-degree of each miner's connections small but targeted -they connect to a subset of relay nodes that were globally distributed. e relay nodes, in turn, have a large out-degree for quick transmission within a geographic location. Appendix A provides further details on our peer-to-peer network setup.
Networking Results
Using such network setup, we measured message delivery times for various system and block size. Figure 5 summarizes the results of our experiments. In Figure 5a we the time required for miner selection (combined intent message delivery and con rmation message reception from validator commitee). is time grows from 130 ms for small validator commi ee size V = 5 to 257 ms for large commi ee size V = 1000. We conclude that se ing the duration of these phases to one second is su cient in a network environment like ours. We include the arguably excess bu er to account for clock dri s and network ji ers. In our testing, we found that se ing this value to 300 ms was su cient, however, we recommend 1 second in recognition of the higher heterogeneity of real-world networks compared to our test environment. Figure 5b shows the time required for block dissemination (95th percentile gures) that grows from 357 ms for a system size of n = 10 active nodes to 1.1 seconds for a system size of n = 10, 000 active nodes. We conclude that se ing the duration of block dissemination phase to 4 seconds is su cient.
We acknowledge that real-world performance might di er from these numbers since the AWS nodes used in our experiments may have be er networking connection than that can be expected from ordinary participants. e epoch times would need to be evaluated per network layout and deployment. However, we believe that our set values of 1 and 4 seconds are a good rule of thumb, and they recent estimates for the Ethereum network [11] . In our experiments we observed that Dandelion-like message passing reduced message delivery times signi cantly which may in part explain why our test network provides be er performance than the current Ethereum or Bitcoin networks.
Estimated roughput and Latency
In Bitcoin, throughput tp can be approximated as:
where B is the block size, t r is the round time (or block generation rate) and T is the transaction size.
In our system, the block header grows with the validator commi ee size due to the con rmation messages that need to be included for tracking currently active nodes. We include enrollment messages to blocks which need to be accounted when estimating throughput.
erefore, in identity aging, throughput can be approximated as:
where V is the validator commi ee size, H is invariant block header (128 bytes), S C is the size of the con rmation message (416 bytes), n e is the average number of enrolled identities per round, and S E is the size of the enrollment message.
Assuming a block size of 2MB, V = 100 validators (for n = 10, 000 active identities) and only few enrollments per round (owing to the low block time), block header in total consume less than 1% 10 of the block (i.e., leaving 99%+ for the transaction). Assuming a very large system with V = 1000 validators (for n = 100, 000 active identities) and similar block size, the total overhead increases to approximately 8% of the block. In a system of approximately 1.5 million active identities, the block would be almost completely consumed by con rmation messages.
To estimate throughput, we assume an average transactions size of 250 bytes similar to Bitcoin [9] . Assuming a system of 10,000 active identities (approximately the size of the current Bitcoin network), block size of 2MB and 100 validators, identity aging would provide a throughput of approximately 1500 transaction per second.
is is two orders of magnitude more than Bitcoin. Latency l is given by the chosen round duration and assumed fork depth, e.g., l = t r × d = 15 seconds.
We note that given the sub-linear scale-up in block dissemination times versus block size (see in Fig. 5b that quadrupling the block size only doubled the dissemination time), it may be possible to further improve our throughput by experimenting with larger block sizes. We were limited to 2MB blocks due to our test environment cost.
DISCUSSION
Other infrastructures. Since SCIFER does not rely on enclave execution integrity or data con dentiality, our approach is not limited to trusted execution environments, but similar reliable identities could be bootstrapped also from other existing infrastructures that cannot be easily manipulated. For example, mobile phone operators or credit card companies could take the role of IAS a estation service and provide an interface that allows their customers to enroll new identities in controlled manner (e.g., one identity per person or mobile subscription).
Another existing infrastructure that could be leveraged through a estation is TrustZone [6] smartphones. Also the recent e orts to standardize EPID provisioning and a estation across manufacturers [24, 25] could provide a vendor independent way of bootstrapping identities in near future. Identities could be also bootstrapped from multiple sources (say, credit card number and TrustZone smartphone and registered phone number) to provide the right security and usability properties for the particular use case.
Penalizing malicious behavior. In most fully-decentralized consensus systems identities can be easily changed (e.g., in Bitcoin the miner could use a di erent public key every time he starts mining for a new block). In our approach identities cannot be changed a er the initial enrollment. One advantage of such long-lived identities is that penalizing malicious behavior becomes possible. For example, if a validator commi ee member con rms multiple intents on the same round, any entity that observes this can broadcast the con icting (and signed) con rmation messages and the next miner can include them to a new block as a cheating evidence to eliminate the malicious identity from the system. us, users have an incentive to avoid such misbehavior. In systems withs changeable identities, similar incentives are typically missing.
Privacy implications. In identity aging, mining is based on long-term identities, and therefore correlation of mining events by the same participant becomes trivial. is is a limitation of our approach compared consensus systems where participants pick new identities for every mining a empt or round. However, we stress that the identities used for transactions can be separate from those used for mining. For example, transactions can use changeable pseudonyms or cryptographic commitments that hide user identities and transaction values [26, 35] .
Network-level attacks. Another minor drawback of our system is that it can make denial-of-service (DoS) a acks easier. is is because miner candidate selection in our system is predictable, in contrast to unpredictable PoW-mining or systems where a large set is chosen as collective miner (voting systems). To prevent DoS attacks, the participants could a empt to hide their IP addresses. For example, the Dandelion routing [48] that we use in our experiments hides source IP addresses (to some extent).
Eclipsing a participant [23] is less e ective in our approach compared to systems like Bitcoin. Although an eclipsed victim's view of the recently mined blocks can be biased, the adversary cannot create su ciently long forks that would make the victim node accept double spending.
Stale chips. In S , participants are incentivized to buy the cheapest SGX processors that enable enrollment. e market value of a typical CPU decreases substantially in few years a er its release. If processors have signi cantly di erent value, this could raise questions about the fairness of our approach [7] . We argue that Intel is unlikely to sell unused but outdated products in mass-scale and purchasing cheap second-hand processors does not necessarily to provide an advantage either, because those CPUs may have already been enrolled. Also enrollment of old CPUs could be prevented. Recall that the a estation group signature does not identity the individual CPU but it does reveal the manufacturing batch.
Sharding incorporation. Our approach provides signi cantly improved performance over Bitcoin, but because identity aging creates only one block per round our systems cannot provide comparable throughput as sharding based solutions that process transactions in multiple commi ees in parallel. Also the fact that blocks need to include potentially many con rmation messages to track active identities reduces throughput for very large systems. An interesting direction for future work would be to combine reliable identities established through identity aging (energy e ciency) and parallel processing of transactions through sharding (highest throughput).
RELATED WORK
In this section we compare prior solutions to our systems primarily based on their e ciency and security. For a more comprehensive comparison or recent blokchain consensus schemes, we refer the reader to [7] .
Partially-Decentralized Solutions
Similar to S , usage of SGX has been proposed for e cient blockchain consensus in few recent works.
PoET. Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET) [1] leverages the controlow integrity of SGX enclaves that wait a randomly-chosen time and the enclaves that nishes waiting rst becomes the miner. e obvious drawback of this approach is that a single compromised platform wins on every round. Such majority miner can create 11 [38] • forks of arbitrary length and reject all transactions from a target victim. While it may be possible to develop heuristics to detect processors that win the waiting game "too o en", compromised processors will always have an advantage over honest ones. Proof of Luck (PoL) [38] is another similar proposal where each participant enclave picks a random value that is used to choose the miner on the current round.
REM. Resource E cient Mining (REM) [49] replaces the hash computation of Proof of Work with "useful" computation. Each participating enclave performs processing, such as protein unfolding algorithm, and produces an evidence of this computation called Proof of Useful Work (PoUW). REM addresses SGX compromise by limiting the advantage that a compromised CPU can get by capping the accepted rate of useful computation an enclave can report to an estimated maximum value. e main drawback is that continuous computation is needed to maintaining consensus.
Other. Teechain [32] uses SGX enclaves to establish secure o -chain payment channels that can improve throughput and latency, but such solutions do not address the problem of blockchain consensus. Also Teechain is vulnerable to CPU compromise.
Summary. Table 1 summarizes our comparison. S is the only SGX solution that saves energy, improves throughput and latency and tolerates compromised CPUs. Additionally, our solution enables bootstrapping identities from di erent infrastructures besides SGX. None of the solutions is scalable in the sense that systems with more participants provide higher throughput.
Fully-Decentralized Solutions
Similar to D , many recent works have addressed the problem of blockchain consensus in a fully-decentralized se ing. Here we review representative solutions.
Proof of Work. Bitcoin-NG [20] decouples the two main tasks of Bitcoin mining: leader election and transaction serialization. Every epoch a leader is chosen using Proof of Work. e leader can generate multiple "microblocks" that serialize transactions. Bitcoin-NG increases throughput, but does not save energy. Latency is similar to Bitcoin. FruitChains [42] is another proposal with two types of blocks that improves energy e ciency, but still requires constant computation. roughput and latency are similar to Bitcoin. In GHOST [46] , the heaviest subtree is selected instead of the longest chain. Similarly, GHOST can reduce wasted blocks, but it still requires constant computation.
In comparison, D requires no constant computation and it improves both throughput and latency. e main drawback is lesser DoS a ack resilience and slightly increased messaging.
Sharding. Elastico [34] uses sharding to improve blockchain performance. During each epoch, participants establish identities using Proof of Work, all identities in the system are split into commi ees (shards), each commi ee agrees consensus on a subset of transactions using a BFT protocol, and a nal commi ee agrees consensus over the output of each shard, again using a BFT protocol. Solidus [5] , ByzCoin [30] , PeerCensus [15] and Hybrid Consensus [43] are similar designs. OmniLedger [31] enables secure processing of transactions that touch more than one shard.
Sharding enables high throughput, low latency and scalability (i.e., increase in the number of participants increases throughput).
e main drawback is that identity creation requires constant computation. D o er smaller throughput and latency improvement compared to sharding, but in turn saves energy. Combining identity aging and sharding is an interesting direction for future work.
Proof of Stake. Algorand [37] assigns a weight to each user based on the amount of money they have (i.e., their stake in the system). On each epoch, using such weights, a random set of users is chosen to a commi ee that in turn agrees consensus over transaction using a BFT protocol. Algorand assumes a fully-adaptive adversary and selects the validator commi ee using cryptographic sortition and a customized consensus protocol that requires several rounds of communication. Similarly in Ouroborous [27] the probability of being chosen to a commi ee is proportional to owned money. Also Ouroborous considers a fully-adaptive adversary and the commi ee selection leverages a secure multi-party computation (MPC) that also requires several communication rounds. Show White [14] is a further example of Proof of Stake consensus system. D provides comparable e ciency as Proof-of-Stake systems that o en assume a (weakly) synchronous communication, where as we consider unreliably message delivery which corresponds to measurements from the Bitcoin network [16] . Our system has builtin incentives that are missing from some Proof-of-Stake systems [4] and it also requires fewer messaging rounds and enables penalizing misbehaving participants. Our adversary is not fully-adaptive.
Proof of X. In SpaceMint [41] , the probability of a node being chosen as a miner is proportional to the amount of storage space that a miner dedicates. e rationale is that doing a small computation over stored data is more energy e cient than Proof of Work. Such solutions do not improve throughput or latency.
Coin age. BlackCoin (up to v2) [47] and PeerCoin [28] use the concept of coin aging that has similarities to our identity aging. However, both of these systems are vulnerable to the nothing-atstake a ack and therefore they rely on centralized time-stamping service to ensure that deep forks cannot occur. Also their stake is inherently linked to coins, (i.e., no fungibility) which is a severe shortcoming for a currency system.
Other. Sleepy consensus [44] is designed to progress and provide consensus even when the majority of commi ee members are o ine, assuming that among those that are online, the majority behave honestly for a su ciently long period of time. Our systems track active identities by including con rmation messages to blocks. 12 Summary. Table 2 summarizes our comparison. D saves energy and improves Bitcoin's performance signi cantly, but does not scale like sharding. Our system requires less messaging that solutions that consider a fully-adaptive adversary. Another advantage of our solution is that is allows penalizing malicious participants. Moreover, since identity aging provides predictable rewards to participants, there is no incentive to join mining pools which e ectively centralize many comparable systems.
CONCLUSION
Bitcoin has shown that it is possible to realize a digital currency in a fully-decentralized se ing, but its consensus mechanism has serious shortcomings. In this paper we have proposed identity aging as a new blockchain consensus approach that leverages long-term reliable identities that can be either bootstrapped from an existing infrastructure or mined without any trusted authority. Identity aging saves energy, improves throughput and latency, and provides good security. We believe that our approach can be an important step forward in the quest for be er blockchain consensus.
A EXPERIMENTAL NETWORK SETUP
In this appendix we provide further details on our peer-to-peer network test environment.
One of the optimizations that we performed to achieve fast message delivery times in a global P2P network is the implementation of a Dandelion-like networking structure [48] . During our preliminary testing we observed that the bulk of our delay came from the initial block transmission by the miner (due to a high out-degree) and due to multiple hops across geographically distant locations. To solve these issues, we implemented a networking structure as shown in Figure 6 . Essentially, we elected some nodes within a cluster of geographically close nodes to serve as "Middle clients" -nodes that are directly connected to by miners when choosing to broadcast the block (we did not use this in the intent phase as it did not lead to any noticeable improvement in performance). ese middle clients could then a ord to have a large out-degree owing e di erent labels for the nodes are for illustrative purposes only -all the nodes run identical so ware.
e core optimization here is the introduction of well-known "Middle Clients" that have a large out-degree in a particular geographical cluster, thus reducing the number of long-distance hops required.
to their proximity to a large number of nodes. is optimization led to a signi cant reduction in latency.
We note that the middle clients are in no way di erent from all the other nodes. Any node could be chosen as a middle client (they all run identical so ware) and messages may be broadcast to multiple middle clients within a cluster. We imagine that in a large community-backed deployment, these middle clients may end up being chosen by some reliability and performance metrics as seen in the Tor network. We recommend that maintainers of existing consensus frameworks should explore similar geographically-minded networking schemes as it could lead to substantial improvements in performance.
B INTEL SGX BACKGROUND
In this appendix we provide brief background information on Intel SGX [3] . For a more detailed explanation of the architecture, we refer the reader to [13] .
B.1 SGX Architecture
Intel's So ware Guard Extension (SGX) introduces a set of CPU instructions for creating and managing protected applications called enclaves. Enclaves are isolated from all so ware running on the system, including privileged so ware like the OS [13] . e SGX trust model assumes the CPU itself to be the only trustworthy hardware component of the system, i.e., enclave data is handled in plain-text only inside the CPU. Whenever data is moved out of the CPU, e.g., into the memory (DRAM), it is encrypted and integrity protected using a dedicated memory encryption engine in the CPU. 14 Figure 7 : SGX attestation overview. Remote attestation is an interactive protocol that involves three parties: remote veri er, the attested SGX platform and Intel Attestation Service (IAS).
e OS, although untrusted, is responsible for creating and managing enclaves.
e operating system allocates memory for the enclaves and copies the initial data and code into the enclave. Initialization actions of the OS are recorded securely by SGX inside the CPU. e initialization process creates a measurement that captures the enclave's code con guration and can be used for later veri cation by an external party (a estation). e sealing capability of SGX enables persistent secure storage of enclave data such that the data is only available to correctly created instances of the same enclave that originally saved it.
Enclaves cannot directly execute system calls, and therefore developers must divide their applications into two parts. Protected processing takes place within the enclave and an unprotected part (run as normal user-level process) must handle operations such as le system access and networking using the untrusted OS.
B.2 SGX Remote Attestation
Remote a estation is a procedure, where an external veri er checks that certain enclave code is correctly initialized and running on the a ested device. Remote a estation is an interactive protocol between three parties: (i) the remote veri er, (ii) the a ested SGX platform, and (iii) Intel A estation Service (IAS), an online service operated by Intel. During manufacturing each SGX processor is equipped with a unique a estation key that IAS uses for veri cation. Each SGX platform includes a trusted system component called oting Enclave that has exclusive access to the a estation key.
e remote a estation process is illustrated in Figure 7: (1) e remote veri er sends a random challenge to the a ested platform. (2) e unprotected application forwards the challenge to the enclave that (3) returns a REPORT data structure encrypted for the oting Enclave containing the enclave's measurement created during its initialization. e REPORT data structure includes a USERDATA eld, where the a ested enclave can include application-speci c a estation information, e.g., hash of public key. (4) e unprotected application forwards REPORT to oting Enclave that (5) veri es it and returns a QUOTE structure signed by the processor-speci c a estation key. (6) e unprotected application sends QUOTE to the remote veri er that (7) forwards it to the IAS online service using TLS. (8) IAS veri es the QUOTE signature, checks that the a estation key has not been revoked, and in case of successful attestation returns the QUOTE structure signed by IAS. A successful protocol run also establishes a secure channel between the remote veri er and the enclave. e a estation key is a part of a group signature scheme called EPID (Enhanced Privacy ID) [25] that supports two signature modes.
e default mode is privacy-preserving and does not uniquely identify the processor to IAS (the signature only identi es a group like certain processor manufacturing batch). Linkable signature mode allows IAS to verify, if the currently a ested CPU is the same as previously a ested CPU.
Usage of SGX a estation requires registration with Intel. In Intel terminology, the a estation veri er is called "service provider", and upon registration each service provider receives a credential that they use to authenticate to IAS. Linkable mode of a estation needs to be enabled at the time of service provider registration. If linkable mode of a estation is used, IAS reports the same pseudonym every time the same service provider requests a estation of the same CPU [2] .
